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Jacksonian Paranoia, and the
Original Confidence Man
Matt Seybold
Zachary Taylor’s 1849 inaugural address began, “The confidence and respect 
shown by my countrymen in calling me to be the Chief Magistrate of a Republic 
holding a high rank among the nations of the earth have inspired me with feel-
ings of the most profound gratitude.” With his opening invocation of confidence, 
Taylor echoes two tropes characteristic of Jacksonian presidential rhetoric. First, 
confidence signifies the democratic mandate that empowers the executive branch. 
William Henry Harrison ended his marathon address by emphasizing the “entire 
confidence” he shared with “a just and generous people” in his ability to “dis-
charge the high duties of [his] exalted station.” This latter phrase, like Taylor’s 
“high rank among the nations of the earth,” shows that confidence also alludes to 
the assurance and ambition that justifies manifest destiny. Franklin Pierce would 
make this the crux of his address, speaking of a “hopeful confidence” that assured 
him that even “if your past is limited, your future is boundless” and the “unex-
plored pathway of advancement . . . will be limitless as duration.”
Preceding the epochal election of Abraham Lincoln, eight consecutive 
president-elects made confidence a centerpiece of their inaugurations. The twin 
implications of confidence in these speeches—executive power emanating 
from electoral populism and urgent imperialism driven by nationalism—are, of 
course, both substantially embodied by the president who named the era. How-
ever ineffectual his successors were, all emulated Andrew Jackson’s campaign 
tactics, including his exceptionalist rhetoric of confidence. Jackson spoke of 
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confidence in nearly every public address, as appreciation for the public’s faith 
and as the reason for America’s political, economic, and military resiliency. His 
fabled populism is on display even in his private correspondence, as when he 
tells James Hamilton Jr., in a letter anticipating tariff disputes that would climax 
in the 1832 nullification crisis, that he has “great confidence in the virtue of the 
great majority of the people.”1
But even for Jackson, confidence also contained specific cynical connota-
tions, usually associated with finance. The first populist debate over America’s 
economic infrastructure—Jackson’s campaign to revoke the charter of the Sec-
ond Bank of the United States—was replete with appeals to confidence. Jack-
son would accuse the Second Bank of having “destroyed the confidence of the 
public” and having the potential “to destroy the confidence of mankind in popu-
lar governments.”2 A letter to a protégé makes clear that Jackson recognized the 
rhetoric of confidence as potentially duplicitous, even though he relied heavily 
on it. He writes, “The advice I give to all my young friends . . . as they pass 
through life have apparent confidence in all, real confidence in none.”3 More 
than two decades before the term confidence man would be coined, Jackson 
gives voice to the archetype’s paradigmatic paradox, what Kathleen De Grave, 
in her study of nineteenth-century con artists, calls “the mixture of cynicism 
and idealism [which] is as essential to the American tradition as are Frank-
lin and Paine.”4 The character De Grave identifies as a literary antecedent to 
the con-man archetype is, appropriately, an allegorical incarnation of President 
Jackson, J. J. Hooper’s Simon Suggs.5
As Herman Melville’s The Confidence-Man (1857) dramatizes, the word 
confidence was, hauntingly, a lexical nexus for many distinguishing traits of 
Jacksonian America. Depending on context, it could describe or promote not 
only the growth of executive power, exceptionalism, and populism but also 
the rapid and largely organic development of sprawling economic and legal 
infrastructures. As Stephen Mihm demonstrates in A Nation of Counterfeiters 
(2007), confidence, both rhetorical and psychological, was the central force 
sustaining commerce and finance. When Mihm says “at its core, capitalism 
was little more than a confidence game,” he is echoing Melville’s officer of the 
Philosophical Intelligence Office who, on extracting his fee from one of the 
novel’s most stubborn skeptics, says, “Confidence is the indispensible basis of 
all sorts of business transactions. Without it, commerce between man and man, 
as between country and country, would, like a watch, run down and stop.”6 
Nascent antebellum markets for currency, securities, and other forms of credit 
were largely unregulated, frequently prone to corruption and fraud, and liable 
to collapse under minimal public scrutiny. But, despite apparent imperfections, 
these markets were essential to supporting an economy of goods and services 
that was growing much more rapidly than its stock of liquid capital. Stock wa-
terers, coin clippers, note shavers, wildcat bankers, and other forms of counter-
feiters and con artists, many of whom are passengers aboard Melville’s steam-
boat microcosm, were frequently performing, as Mihm puts it, “a public service 
Destroyer of Confidence  85
by increasing the amount of money in circulation in a part of the world where 
the demand for money invariably outstripped the supply.”7 Both on the frontier 
and in overpopulated metropolises, the line between legitimate and criminal 
enterprise was not clearly drawn, and the former often depended on the latter, 
which may be one reason that the con-artist archetype adapted very easily to 
portrayals of both petty villains and romantic heroes. As Melville’s friend Evert 
Duyckinck put it in his New York World, “It is not the worst thing that can be 
said of a country that it gives birth to a confidence man.”8
As Duyckinck’s quote suggests, because the con, at least in sobriquet, is 
uniquely American, many took patriotic pride even in its pejorative implica-
tions. As Daniel Williams writes, “All instances of fraud [were] presented as 
ingenious acts of self-creation and [were] ironically justified as demonstrations 
of ‘his country’s genius.’”9 The con man would evolve rather quickly into the 
antiheroic protagonist who remains well represented in U.S. literature and cin-
ema. This essay, however, examines efforts by the popular newspaper editor 
who introduced the confidence man to the public to use the figure to expose 
the fragility of the antebellum economy and discredit the rhetoric of confidence 
used by politicians, financiers, and rival pundits to protect it. James Gordon 
Bennett, owner, editor, and primary correspondent for the New York Herald, 
spent the 1850s programmatically dismantling public confidence in Wall Street 
and the broader system of political economy with which it was increasingly in-
tertwined. Although Bennett characterized himself as a champion of Jacksonian 
Democracy, the Union, and free trade, he would see all three endangered by the 
widespread political discord and economic anxiety that he was substantially 
responsible for provoking in his large and diverse readership. The story of the 
origin of the confidence man is also the story of the culture of disunion and of 
the mutual anxiety of influence between organized finance and mass media that 
persists into the twenty-first century.
Perhaps because they recognized to some degree the ambivalent ubiquity 
of the financial innovation and chicanery that Mihm documents, Jacksonian 
American readers had a rapacious appetite for stories of deviance. As Bruce 
Franklin shows, “By the early nineteenth century the lives of criminals were 
becoming an especially popular American literary form.”10 Bennett, a veteran 
reporter for the “six-penny” mercantile papers that catered to bourgeois New 
York, recognized that a “penny paper” marketed to the Jacksonian proletariat 
would be wise to covet erotic, violent, and other sensational content reminis-
cent of adventure novels, melodramatic theater, pornographic pamphlets, and 
other forms of inexpensive urban entertainment. The front page of the first issue 
of Bennett’s New York Herald was dedicated to the murder trial of Robert Mat-
thews, a religious imposter, extortionist, and Don Juan who cofounded a cult in 
New Jersey, was suspected of murdering his partner, and attempted, unsuccess-
fully, to usurp Joseph Smith in the Mormon communes of Ohio.11 If Matthews 
had been tried two decades later, Bennett would undoubtedly have labeled him 
a “confidence man.”
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The Herald catered to the public’s peculiar taste for criminality by intro-
ducing its idioms into every aspect of publication. Headlines and ledes for all 
variety of articles favored an increasingly vast vocabulary of deception. Words 
like swindle, scam, dupe, rope, hoodwink, mark, fixer, quack, sucker, diddler, 
and humbug—many of which, like con man, were invented or popularized by 
Jacksonian Americans—gravitated from the crime and court pages to coverage 
of politics, sports, society, diplomacy, and commerce.12 This expanding lexicon 
of malfeasance is evidence that innovative criminality was indeed prevalent 
in antebellum America, but the energy and eagerness with which Jacksonian 
readers consumed and perpetuated stories of sensational crime also explains 
how they became increasingly predisposed to believe that ingenious criminal 
masterminds were lurking everywhere.
During the same month Bennett launched the Herald, Virgil Stewart and 
Augustus Walton began circulating the pamphlet that would become the best-
selling History of Virgil Stewart (1836). In this masterpiece of conspiracy theo-
ry and synthesized prejudice, Stewart alleges that John Murrell, a professional 
horse thief against whom Stewart had testified in Tennessee the previous year, 
was in league with a “mystic clan” of abolitionists, free blacks, land specula-
tors, Jews, and Whigs to instigate a Christmas Day slave uprising as a diversion 
for a series of carefully orchestrated bank robberies in New Orleans and other 
southern metropolises. The Arkansas Gazette hailed Stewart as “the Jackson 
Truth Teller,” both for his stated affinity for the president and because he hailed 
from the very town that had been named after the hero of the Battle of New Or-
leans. Allusions to Murrell and his Mystic Clan would be common to the penny 
papers that flourished in the coming decade, including the Herald. A “versatile 
chevalier” hawks pamphlets about Murrell and other mythic frontier criminals 
in the opening scene of The Confidence-Man.13 But, while Murrell’s trial was 
real enough, Stewart’s History is obviously a work of propagandistic fiction 
written in the aforementioned paranoid style, which erects a false coherence 
around recent traumatic events and marshals the fear and bigotry of aggrieved 
constituencies to a partisan cause.14
Apparent efforts to enfranchise, educate, and innovate helped associate 
Jackson with the imaginative optimism of Washington Irving, Ralph Waldo 
Emerson, and Walt Whitman.15 But Jackson is also complicit in the growth of 
the paranoid canon in both size and stature. Jackson’s reputation for patriotism 
and populism disguised the deep insecurity bred by childhood trauma, aban-
donment, libel, and betrayal. This suspicious temperament, which provoked 
him to recommend “apparent confidence in all, real confidence in none,” is 
as representative of the era as Whitman’s mania. Jackson’s Janus faces, manic 
neophilia, and reactionary paranoia were emulated by many of his constituents, 
including Bennett, who presented his paper as an explicit instrument of mani-
fest destiny. In a characteristically fiery 1836 editorial, Bennett promised that 
by increasing the Herald’s cover price by one cent, he could “bring about more 
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rapidly my great New Testament schemes of reform in business, in politics, in 
morals, in social life, and in religious feelings and practices.” He concluded,
I am determined to make the Herald the greatest paper that 
ever appeared in the world. . . . Books have had their day—
the theatres have had their day—the temple of religion has 
had its day. A newspaper can send more souls to Heaven, and 
save more from Hell, than all the churches and chapels in 
New York—besides making money at the same time. Let it 
be tried.16
Based on such declarations, Bennett would seem to share Emerson’s and Whit-
man’s faith in the ameliorative powers of democratic governance, entrepreneur-
ship, and individualism, but in the coming decades, while never abandoning 
the exceptionalist rhetoric, Bennett would frequently use the Herald to foster 
luddism, xenophobia, and other reactionary politics.
In 1969, Johannes Bergmann identified the first appearance of the term 
confidence man in Bennett’s Herald in the summer of 1849. Bergmann’s dis-
covery prompted a fleeting interest in tracing the term’s proliferation in print 
over the next decade, concerned primarily with anticipating the publication of 
Melville’s novel on April Fool’s Day 1857.17 This limited investigation into the 
origin of the term coincided with a brief trend in American literature and Ameri-
can studies scholarship dedicated to analyzing the archetype of the confidence 
man and the trope of the confidence game in U.S. culture, climaxing with Karen 
Halttunen’s Confidence Men & Painted Women (1982).18 Most of these studies 
assumed one of two things: either that both the term confidence man and the 
mythic figure associated with it were already established in colonial folklore 
(it was therefore mere coincidence that the Herald was the first to make that 
tradition a part of the historical record) or that it was a self-referential moniker 
invented by the petty criminal who was the focus of the Herald articles. Most 
previous scholarship on the con man treats the Herald as merely Melville’s 
window to the antebellum world, a vehicle through which he received and or-
ganized the cultural detritus of the metropolis and the nation. This obscures 
the fact that the Herald was itself a revolutionary, persuasive, and imaginative 
shaper of that culture, dominated by an autocratic editor in chief. As I shall 
demonstrate, the con-man mythos was conspicuously convenient to the designs 
of the Herald’s editor, who used the associated terms with greater frequency 
than any of his peers throughout the coming decade. Whether or not Bennett 
invented the con man, he ensured the permanent popularity of both the epithet 
and many of the tropes associated with it.
My interest goes beyond establishing the Herald as one of the Melville’s 
primary sources, though it certainly was.19 Melville’s novel—subtle, haunting, 
and prophetic as it proves to be—is a misleading place to begin a study of the 
confidence man in American language and literature. For one thing, the abun-
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dance of punning and riffing on confidence within the novel suggests that Mel-
ville believed that the duplicitous rhetoric of confidence was already familiar 
and even transparent to at least some portion of his imagined readership. Edwin 
Fussell states that “every word is ironic,” as Melville’s novel sought to dem-
onstrate that invocations of confidence “served primarily to conceal the basest 
ends with the emptiest rhetoric.” Fussell’s reading of The Confidence-Man as a 
satire of “tireless publicists” invites the question, Whose “empty rhetoric” was 
Melville parroting?20
Also, while The Confidence-Man marked the nadir of Melville’s commer-
cial career, the most poorly received novel of his lifetime and the last, the New 
York Herald was the most widely distributed and most popular daily newspaper 
in America, read or at least purchased by 60,000 to 80,000 people every day 
during the 1850s.21 Bennett leaned heavily on the term confidence man and its 
derivations, dramatically expanding their descriptive, figurative, and polemical 
utility over the course of the decade. By the time Lincoln was elected, Bennett’s 
obsessive invocations ensured that conning expressions were a permanent part 
of the American vocabulary, and the associated tropes could be readily mar-
shaled in critiques of public figures, particularly those whom Bennett viewed 
as complicit in creating financial oligopoly. The intertwined evolution of the 
philology of confidence and the mythology of the con embodies the paradoxical 
progressivism of the Jacksonian era. As the United States moved toward the 
Civil War, confidence, an established presidential shorthand for the promise 
of the nation, also described the cultivation and practice of deception and in-
sincerity, which, when exposed, generated distrust and destroyed democratic 
sympathies.
Let It Be Tried
On most days during the 1850s, the Herald outsold the combined efforts of 
its three nearest competitors: Horace Greeley’s Tribune, William Cullen Bry-
ant’s Post, and Henry Raymond’s New York Times.22 Its market dominance ex-
tended beyond the metropolis, as it was the most read national newspaper in the 
South and the West and the only U.S. newspaper with an established European 
edition. From the moment of its introduction, Bennett’s Herald was on the “cut-
ting edge” of every advancement in “the newspaper revolution” in both the 
style and the substance of its contents, the technology of its production, and its 
marketing and advertising.23
The Herald was the first “penny paper” to both cultivate a populist read-
ership and cut into the market of the more expensive (and elitist) mercantile 
publications, like James Watson Webb’s Courier and Enquirer. Bennett had a 
noteworthy career working for Webb and other mercantile editors as a political 
correspondent, market analyst, court reporter, and junior editor. He understood 
what would be required to appropriate their readership, namely, shipping news, 
stock quotes, legislative and judicial proceedings, and dispatches from Europe. 
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He believed he could provide the information essential to bourgeois business 
while also supplementing it with material that appealed to the increasingly liter-
ate proletariat. To the latter, larger, and underserved constituency, he offered a 
heaping portion of crime, gossip, and scandal but hoped they would also come 
to view his newspaper as an inexpensive educational tool both for reading in-
struction and for engagement with politics, economics, and law. To this effect, 
Bennett’s editorials often took on a quasi-pedagogical tone.
The Herald achieved enormous overnight popularity by actively seeking 
controversy in both content and presentation. By the middle of 1836, Bennett 
reported a daily readership of more than 20,000. The ensuing windfall, though 
it put him firmly among New York’s nouveau riche, taught him only to be more 
persistent in mocking elites. Factions as disparate as stockbrokers, Methodists, 
and English aristocracy came together in their vehemence toward the “snake 
of newspapers.”24 Bennett is the most notable publishing tycoon to be pub-
licly beaten on the streets of Manhattan—thrice.25 Each time, taking great pride 
in his journalistic objectivity, Bennett printed an account of his assault in the 
Herald’s morning edition. His intransigence and outright mania in the face of 
boycott, injury, and humiliation suggests that Bennett was a firm believer in that 
familiar credo: no publicity is bad publicity.
Bennett was similarly obstinate in the face of political and legal authori-
ties. He was something of a First Amendment crusader. While working as a 
freelance reporter covering the trial for the murder of Captain Joseph White in 
Salem in 1830, Bennett argued that the gag order from the Massachusetts judge 
should have no bearing on the publication of his coverage in a neighboring 
state, writing,
It is an old worm-eaten dogma of the courts to consider the 
publicity given to every event by the press as destructive to 
the interests of law and justice. The honesty—the purity—
the integrity of legal practice and legal decisions throughout 
the country are more indebted to the American press than the 
whole tribe of lawyers and judges who issue their decrees. 
The press is the living jury of the nation.26
It should be no surprise that the paper founded by this cocksure court reporter 
covered criminal proceedings with unprecedented verve. The Herald followed 
its favorite defendants for weeks and even months through their arrests, the 
exposition of their supposed exploits, and their trials, transcripts of which were 
often published in full.
The paper’s first big “scoop” came in 1836 when Bennett snuck into Ellen 
Jewett’s boudoir after the New York courtesan had been gruesomely murdered 
and, while the body still lay on the floor, wrote a detailed description not only 
of the deceased but also of the ribald contents of her closets and drawers. Based 
on his investigations, Bennett became convinced that the man charged with the 
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murder was framed. He published his suspicions, and a few weeks later, the 
jurors in the case concurred.27 Such coverage was, certainly, a concession to the 
profitability of sensationalism, but in many cases, the attention brought on by 
Bennett’s meticulous reporting forced police, attorneys, and judges to be more 
thorough and inscrutable. If there was anything Bennett and his readership 
liked more than sex and violence it was the exposure of corruption and graft. 
Whether his primary goal was to offer the “living jury of the nation” access 
to the proceedings of their courts or merely to provide his plebian readership 
with a plethora of titillating material, the Herald took a conspicuous interest in 
criminal oddities from the moment Bennett brought it into circulation. As Rich-
ard O’Connor puts it, “He made the newspaper readable by ordinary people by 
‘discovering and encouraging the popular taste for vicarious vice and crime.’”28
Bennett demonstrated a special fondness for stories of impersonation, se-
duction, extortion, counterfeit, and fraud, in other words, cons. Throughout the 
1930s and 1940s, Bennett would regularly characterize perpetrators of a wide 
variety of alleged frauds as “Jeremy Diddlers” or “Peter Funks,” characters 
from early American fiction who have since been identified as predecessors to 
the con-man archetype, but the Herald had been circulating for more than two 
decades before Bennett discovered (or invented) the character that would have 
the most lasting impression on both his contemporary readers and the U.S. liter-
ary tradition.29
The Original Confidence Man on Wall Street
In 1840, an anonymous satirical epistolary memoir by David Theodosius 
Hines detailed the narrator’s effort to become South Carolina’s greatest “gentle-
man of the road” by virtue of quackery, larceny, and seduction. Hines addresses 
the bulk of his letters to James Gordon Bennett, assuming the Herald eager 
to publish the autobiography of a self-described “humbug.”30 Hines declares, 
“If there ever was an era especially favorable to the exercise of my particular 
talents, it is this.”31 Although it predates the term, Hans Bergmann asserts that 
Hines’s Life “is a ‘confidence book’ about a confidence man,” which seeks, by 
making Bennett an accomplice of the fictional deviant, to aid in the “moral war” 
against Bennett, which reached its height the same year.32 Like Stewart’s His-
tory and other dubious criminal memoirs of the era, the Life paints Jacksonians 
as corrupt, irreligious, and vulgar but also possessed of a rapacious appetite for 
editorializing on all variety of topics. As such, the penny press seems, as David 
Mindich puts it, to “[spring] out of ‘Jacksonian democracy’ in much the same 
way as Athena was born from Zeus’s head.”33
The “Original Confidence Man,” as he would come to be known, appeared 
first on July 8, 1849, as William Thompson (and later as Samuel Williams, Wil-
liam Davis, and Samuel Willis). He was a regular in the Herald until his death, 
as he was arrested, tried, and imprisoned several times in several states.34 The 
moniker with which he would be permanently associated arose out of the scam 
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that resulted in his first arrest. Thompson would gregariously strike up conver-
sations with strangers on the streets of Manhattan, proceeding, after some time, 
to the subject of man’s lack of confidence in his fellow man. If his new compa-
triot took the bait and defended the magnanimity of his race, Thompson would 
ask, as a demonstration of that faith, to borrow his watch or his wallet, with 
which he would, of course, abscond.35 Bennett immediately recognized that the 
con had the potential to become part of a devastating polemic. In the weekend 
edition of the Herald, immediately following Thompson’s arrest, the editor was 
already sculpting an intrepid analogy between the charismatic street hustler and 
what he viewed as a Wall Street cabal.
In “The Confidence Man’ on a Large Scale,” Bennett frames William 
Thompson as a skilled rhetorician and salesman who could, were he but a little 
more ambitious, live in one of the “lordly dwellings” of “the possessors of 
suddenly acquired wealth” on Wall Street. Bennett describes the “Confidence 
Man” as “a certain financial genius” and “a distinguished ‘operator’ from the 
active business of ‘the street.’” As the editorial unfolds, the comparison grows 
progressively more overt: “His genius has been employed on the small scale in 
Broadway. Theirs has been employed in Wall Street. That’s all the difference.” 
He enflames his audience with descriptions of the wealth and arrogance of New 
York’s financial oligarchs while satirically bemoaning Thompson’s shortsight-
edness. Had the con man only directed his “genius, address, tact, and skill” 
toward founding a railroad, he could have “retired to a life of virtuous ease, the 
possessor of a clear conscience, and one million of dollars.” It is the Wall Street 
speculators, he posits, who are most “occupied by the process of ‘confidence’” 
and therefore the “true,” “genuine,” and “real” confidence men.36
In the midst of this virulently sarcastic display, Bennett performs a deadly 
serious dissection of that signature nineteenth-century institution, the railroad 
bubble. In concise steps, he describes the method by which a devious speculator 
could take over a company, manipulate its stock price to attract investors and 
government subsidies without building any meaningful infrastructure, and then 
purposefully drive it into the ground, ruining collaborators along the way and 
walking away with obscene profits. It was not until the 1870s that the ethically 
dubious practices of “Robber Barons” like Jay Gould and Cornelius Vanderbilt 
became an accepted part of American business lore, but Bennett described and 
lambasted such schemes as early as the 1840s and firmly believed that such in-
novative capitalists were no better than any other kind of “original” criminal. 
He recognized that both—criminals and capitalists—were good for selling pa-
pers. Bennett never shrank from an opportunity to draw comparisons between 
plutocrats and petty thieves, an analogy with apparent appeal to his proletarian 
readership.
The attention Bennett paid to the stock market and to commerce generally 
was uncharacteristic of the “penny papers.” This was part of his strategic appro-
priation of the mercantile audience of his previous employers, but Bennett also 
had genuine interest and expertise in finance and economics. He was educated 
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at Blair’s College in Scotland from 1810 to 1814. There was naturally a heavy 
emphasis on David Hume, Adam Smith, and other classical Scottish political 
economists. Via this training, as Michael Schudson points out, Bennett became 
partial to the “the language and morality of laissez faire.”37
The Herald distinguished itself by being motivated by market demands 
rather than ideological prescriptions and identifying the market rationales be-
hind legislation and political rhetoric. But Bennett also, as James Crouthamel 
puts it, “had a tendency to explain economic happenings by a theory of con-
spiracy.”38 He abhorred credit and, as such, viewed securities as a dangerous 
and dishonest illusion.39 He had covered finance exclusively early in his career 
as a freelancer and in that capacity had witnessed firsthand the fallout of the 
commercial crisis of 1825. His coverage of the fraud trials that followed gained 
him a promotion but also got him expelled from the floor of the New York Stock 
Exchange. He had been the bane of “stock-jobbers” ever since.40 He saw it as 
his duty to make the public aware of the dire macroeconomic consequences im-
plicit in the growth of the securities economy. Bennett aimed not only to expose 
“operators” but also to instruct his upwardly mobile readers in sound and fru-
gal investing practice. Not long after the Herald’s founding, Bennett’s “Money 
Market” column became a mainstay of the editorial page. It was designed “to 
tell what Wall Street really is and what is done there” and advise “his readers 
on the effects of interest rates, the money supply, the chicanery of manipula-
tors, and a dozen other factors largely shrouded from the general public and 
often poorly understood by market players and plungers themselves.”41 Ben-
nett’s personal and business ambitions frequently ran at cross-purposes, as is 
evidenced by the fact that his rants against Wall Street were often printed right 
alongside the most reliable commodities and securities quotes in the newspaper 
industry.
In the “Money Market” column, as in all things, Bennett aspired to be read 
and tended toward the sensational, the sententious, and the prejudicial. But the 
inveterate bear has an excellent record as an economic forecaster, predicting 
the booms and busts of the mid-nineteenth century with almost preternatural 
accuracy. Crouthamel goes so far as to assert that “thanks to the Herald’s warn-
ings and its teachings for two decades of the perils of honest traders and bankers 
becoming involved with speculators, the depression would be less severe [in 
1857] than that of 1837.”42 This record is overlooked by those who wish to cast 
Bennett purely as a misanthrope and a conspiracy theorist. There were occa-
sions, during an era when politicians and financiers were increasingly corrupt 
and conspiratorial, that Bennett’s extravagant allegations proved right on the 
money. There were also, especially as the prospect of secession grew more pal-
pable, instances when Bennett assumed the worst, without any strong evidence, 
and urged his readers to do the same.
For Bennett, the implications of confidence were never far removed from 
the market, where the word was repeatedly invoked, especially in times of cri-
sis. Bennett believed that the duplicitous rhetoric of confidence was used to 
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delude the public and disguise the temerity of those responsible for fiscal catas-
trophes, as had been the case during the Panic of 1837. On the morning of May 
10, 1837, the day that banks suspended payments, the United States Gazette, 
mouthpiece for the Van Buren administration, reassured the public, “Let confi-
dence and cheerfulness only prevail.” The next day, Bennett wrote,
The great struggle which causes this explosion began in 1828, 
’29, between Martin Van Buren and Nicholas Biddle. . . . 
Each of these patriots outbid each other for the confidence of 
their community, but, like other Peter Funks at auction, they 
have both bid a bit beyond their capital and their resources.43
As the fallout persisted through the coming months, Bennett framed his com-
petitor’s invocations of confidence as part of a sentimental and opportunistic 
propaganda campaign. Recognizing that Van Buren and his allies, including 
Jackson, had actively fostered distrust of the Hamiltonian banking system with-
out constructing anything stable in its place, Bennett asked, “Who first origi-
nated, in this state, the want of ‘confidence’ in the banking system?”44
Bennett felt that the Panic of 1837 justified the characteristic Jacksonian 
suspicion of all banks and financial institutions. He took an increasingly ag-
gressive and anarchic stance against any and all ascendant financial institu-
tions, particularly if they demonstrated any lobbying power. Bennett’s position 
on finance was, quite simply, burn it all down. During the Panic of 1847, a 
minor crisis originating in Britain, he wrote, “The whole system of free banks 
in this State, is not but an organised, legalised, chartered system of cheating 
and swindling. . . . We trust we shall yet see the banking system purified of this 
corruption and villainy—There is much yet to lop off.” He warned the public 
“to place no confidence in the Wall street organs or Wall street brokers, for they 
are all engaged in the same system of roguery and plunder on the great mass 
of the community, and have always been so.”45 The fraudulent infrastructure 
of the stock market stood exposed, he believed, when “the minds of capitalists 
[were] very much unsettled,” thus “compelling a partial suspension of opera-
tions” that “created a great deal of distrust; tending to the destruction of public 
confidence,” despite the fact that the nation’s “internal affairs [were] in a very 
sound and prosperous condition” and lacked any of the “financial difficulties 
which have caused so many failures in [Europe].”46
Bennett’s analysis of economic crises, born of close attention to the no-
torious market volatility of nineteenth-century America, suggests that he un-
derstood the function of the “state of confidence” in finance, even though this 
would not become an articulated part of economic theory until John Maynard 
Keynes’s General Theory (1935). Securities markets are more susceptible to 
dramatic fluctuations in the state of confidence—that is, “what average opinion 
expects the average opinion to be”—because of the immediacy and the nego-
tiability of the transactions regulated therein. Keynes argues that Americans 
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are “unduly interested” in market trends and that “this national weakness finds 
its nemesis in the stock market.”47 The emotional whims of buyers and sell-
ers influenced by contagious groupthink are efficiently translated into frenzied 
activity in an environment where liquidizing large asset positions is relatively 
quick and easy. Therefore, the potential speed and scale of an economic crisis 
is correlated to the proportion, centralization, and integration of organized fi-
nancial markets relative to the larger economy. “The development of organised 
investment markets,” Keynes observes, “sometimes facilitates investment but 
sometimes adds greatly to the instability of the system.”48 Rapid erasures of 
wealth happen when many economic agents have the opportunity to act on 
fleeting sentiments like fear and panic, more or less in unison. Preaching confi-
dence in moments of crisis is simply an effort, by means of persuasion, to force 
market participants to hesitate, allowing irrational feelings to dissipate naturally 
and buying time to identify and address their underlying causes.
Bennett saw the effects of a sudden disruption of the state of confidence 
in 1837 and 1847 as well as efforts by politicians and financiers to protect the 
larger economy by employing Jackson’s rhetoric of confidence. Two decades 
later, when another crisis seemed inevitable, confidence was, predictably, of-
fered as a solution. After the suspension of specie payments by New York banks 
at the outset of the Panic of 1857, there was a meeting of influential bankers and 
merchants. Moses Grinnell, president of the New York Chamber of Commerce, 
stated that he “felt it to be the imperative duty of the merchants at this juncture 
to unite in this declaration of confidence in the banks.”49
But Bennett comprehended something that eluded even Keynes. In mo-
ments of crisis, when “everything depends on waves of irrational psychology,” 
the orator who reaches the largest crowd of panicked and pliable auditors has 
the greatest capacity to affect the state of confidence.50 When instability and 
uncertainty reign, the media is the market. Bennett gleefully wielded the larg-
est platform for restoring confidence and reveled in the relative incapacity of 
his competitors. By 1857, the once-proud Courier and Enquirer, the preferred 
paper of wealthy Whigs, was spiraling toward bankruptcy, further aided by the 
financial crisis. Webb, whom Bennett had long accused of being a shill for 
the “shinners, skinners and sinners of Wall street,” was among those trying to 
calm the markets, but nobody was reading him. Bennett mocked Webb’s in-
creasingly desperate calls for confidence. “Will nobody help the Chevalier out 
of his distress?” Bennett pleaded ironically, “Confidence—confidence—can’t 
he get a little confidence somewhere at half price?”51 Contrary to Webb and, 
indeed, most commentators on the panic, Bennett did not support relief for fail-
ing banks and businesses or for efforts to calm the market in any fashion. He 
advocated not only strict laissez-faire but might even be accused of leveraging 
his bully pulpit to encourage his readers to applaud and exacerbate the extend of 
economic carnage. “This may lead to many failures, but it is the only remedy,” 
he argued, “Banking houses, railroad companies and individual firms, which 
are really insolvent and past hope, should at once bend to the storm and place 
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themselves in a state of liquidation . . . they will hereafter be entitled to no sym-
pathy, and will be sure to receive very little.”52
In November, at the peak of the crisis, William Thompson, now operating 
under the name of William Burch, was again arrested. In February, he pled 
guilty to passing false checks. While his recent exploits were not as remark-
able as those that originally brought him to Bennett’s attention, his reappear-
ance amidst the pleas for confidence provoked by the Panic of 1857 seems 
to have inspired Bennett to a new appreciation of the rhetorical utility of his 
moniker. Between July 1849 and October 1857, according to Gale’s Nineteenth 
Century Newspapers database, the phrases “confidence man” or “confidence 
game” appeared in the Herald on twenty-six occasions, well more than any 
other newspaper in the database, but over the next three years, leading up to 
the election of Lincoln, the same phrases would appear more than three times 
as often: seventy-eight total invocations. A confluence of events in the middle 
of the decade helped Bennett recognize he could use the con-man archetype as 
a polemical broadax. Speculators bore the brunt of his spite, but Bennett also 
began applying it more loosely to politicians, diplomats, and rival journalists. 
The term that other American writers, if they used it at all, applied exclusively 
to counterfeiters, quacks, seducers, and larcenists Bennett directed most fre-
quently at individuals outside the overtly criminal sphere. In these metaphorical 
invocations, confidence described not only a species of legal transgression but 
also any charismatic performance that might disguise duplicity and covetous-
ness. In other words, confidence in the Herald meant the opposite of what it 
meant most everywhere else. But, to paraphrase the implicit presumption of 
Melville’s novel, more people read the Herald than anything else.
Confidentiality and the Morally Insane
John Kenneth Galbraith argues that every era of “speculative euphoria” in 
America has been associated with a financial wizard whose genius is not in the 
realm of investment but rather in the arena of fraud.53 The 1850s were no excep-
tion. In 1854, George Schuyler, the president of the New York and New Haven 
Railroad Company, engineered a scam that might as well have used Bennett’s 
“Confidence Man on a Large Scale” column as an instruction manual. Schuy-
ler defrauded his stockholders, including the federal government, of around 
$2 million via watered stock, counterfeit issues, and insider trading. Bennett 
recognized the Schuyler case as an opportunity to position two opposing no-
tions of confidence in direct conflict with each other. On July 8, five years to 
the day after the term confidence man first appeared in print, Bennett wrote, in 
a characteristically hyperbolic declaration, “Confidence has been more shaken 
by these disclosures than by any event which has previously occurred within 
the history of the country.” He warned that the nation was “proceeding faster 
in the road of speculation than our resources actually warrant” and that “the 
mania for railroad investment was in fact carrying us to extremes that could 
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not fail to prove ruinous in the end to all the interests connected with them.” 
Considering the lack of caution and oversight represented in the Schuyler case, 
he concluded, “it is not to be wondered at that the ‘confidence men’ have not 
hesitated to avail themselves of the opportunities thrown in their way. It re-
mains to be seen whether the public will continue to supply them with willing 
dupes and victims, or will insist upon reforms.” Bennett hoped, “deplorable as 
is this event, in the destruction of confidence to which it must lead . . . it will 
not be unproductive of some compensating result.”54 Unfortunately, the public 
neither demanded greater oversight nor displayed increased caution and Ben-
nett’s Schuyler column presciently describes several of the factors that brought 
about the Panic of 1857.55 It also marked the beginning of a period in Bennett’s 
editorial career that lasted until the Civil War. While Jackson’s rhetoric of con-
fidence was designed for attacking interests, like the Second Bank of the United 
States, which threatened to compromise citizens’ faith in federal government, 
Bennett increasingly advocated the “destruction of confidence” in government 
and finance as a necessary development in the public consciousness.
For James Gordon Bennett, 1857 was defined by his most concerted at-
tack on confidence to date, beginning on New Year’s Day, when he joyously 
reported on the conviction of Charles B. Huntington. Huntington’s crimes had 
provoked Bennett to repeat the warnings of his Schuyler columns:
If these developments do not open the eyes of our citizens 
to the impure state of the social atmosphere in the neighbor-
hood of Wall Street and of the fashionable quarters where 
mushroom capitalists reside, then they are willfully blind and 
deserve to be periodically made the victims of Jeremy Did-
dlers of every grade.56
Huntington was convicted of forgery, but, as Bennett put it, “the forgeries com-
plained of were not in reality perfected, and were not forgeries in the ordinary 
legal sense of the word, but financial experiments of a ‘confidence man.’”57
Bennett had been waiting for Huntington, an individual who made literal 
the analogy between uptown street hustler and downtown financier he had laid 
out in 1849. Whereas Thompson possessed only “the spirit” of Wall Street, 
Huntington actually kept an office there. Whereas Schuyler was of elite birth 
and high position, his willingness to defraud resulting as much from entitlement 
as anything, Huntington came from nothing and nowhere, created his firm from 
thin air, and pilfered the coffers of the most established and supposedly secure 
banks and brokerages in the financial district. Bennett marveled, “It is difficult 
to comprehend how he, who was unknown in financial circles a year or two 
ago, could have succeeded in victimizing the note-shavers of Wall Street to the 
amount of some half a million dollars.”58 A kind of Wall Street Robin Hood, 
Huntington seemed a fitting successor to mythic deviants like Diddler, Funk, 
Suggs, and Oily Gammon.59
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Huntington was the first in a long line of financial criminals who had a 
genius for exploiting the idiosyncratic inefficiencies in rapidly expanding cor-
porate bureaucracies. In the initial phase of his relationship with a new firm, his 
dealings were completely aboveboard. His banknotes and bonds were genuine, 
and he possessed the funds to back his transactions. His documents were neat, 
legible, and impeccably organized. He cultivated a friendly, casual relationship 
with brokers, clerks, and secretaries. After a number of legitimate trades, he 
“gradually gained the confidence of those with whom he had dealings,” such 
that he was “above suspicion.” At this point, understanding that harried em-
ployees would not bother with due diligence for the transactions of a client 
they had come to trust, he started passing counterfeit documents that were ac-
cepted without hesitation. Through merely his affect—“perfectly cool and non-
chalant”—Huntington had convinced his “marks” he belonged among them.60
As if the crimes were not enough to interest Bennett and his readership, 
Huntington’s trial tread into even more extraordinary territory, as his lawyer 
experimented with a new trend in U.S. criminal law, the “insanity” defense.61 
While the insanity defense had been employed in desperate circumstances in 
U.S. courts for the past two decades, the defendants in such cases were expect-
ed to wear their psychosis on their sleeves. Juries needed to be able to imagine 
the apparent antisocial malady provoking the defendant to unpremeditated acts 
of lust and violence. Huntington’s criminal exploits were, contrarily, defined by 
competence, foresight, and self-awareness. His lawyer argued that he was not 
physiologically insane but “morally insane.” The jury proved quite unsympa-
thetic to the pathology, which improved the sufferer’s social capacity.
Some commentators wondered what could have inspired such a cockama-
mie defense. Bennett knew exactly. Barely a year earlier, the Original Confi-
dence Man, this time arrested while operating as William Davis, had attempted 
a similar defense. Although he pleaded guilty to grand larceny, his sentencing 
hearing included testimony from physicians and family members who vouched 
that he was “the victim of partial insanity, which induced so great a desponden-
cy and depression of spirits, that he had on several occasions attempted to com-
mit suicide.” This testimony was persuasive enough that Davis was sentenced 
to “the lightest penalty that the law would permit.”62 His incarceration was short 
enough that he could be arrested again less than fourteen months later.
“Moral insanity” was something with which James Gordon Bennett could 
make the proverbial hay. In the wake of the Huntington trial, he eagerly paro-
died the classification, much as he did confidence man, and often applied it to 
the very same subjects. In his “Money Market” column, he proclaimed that “all 
the bulls and bears in Wall Street are morally insane” and that “the same spe-
cies of insanity that is given as an excuse for Huntington’s forgeries, prevails in 
Wall Street at this moment to the great extent Purchasers of railroad stocks at 
current prices are inflicted with a kind of moral insanity.”63 In response to a new 
flurry of land grants, Bennett declared, “It is a matter of serious pain and regret 
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to all the rightminded citizens of the United States that the Huntingtonian form 
of moral insanity should prevail to such an alarming extent in Washington.”64
In late January, another scandal involving the railroad industry dominat-
ed the New York papers. On this occasion, Bennett had been scooped. James 
Simonton, D.C. correspondent for the New York Times and future head of the 
Associated Press, uncovered a scheme, orchestrated by lobbyists, to pass a bill 
that would cede lands from the Minnesota Territory to the Pacific Railroad. 
Such bills were relatively common during the era, intended to encourage the 
development of infrastructure between the coasts. What made this one scandal-
ous was that it granted not only the property necessary for laying tracks and 
building stations but all of the federally possessed land in the territory as well, 
most of which, presumably, would have been sold off by Pacific for a profit. 
Simonton alleged that some members in the House of Representatives had been 
paid as much as $1,000 for their votes.
The public’s outrage prompted the formation of a House Lobby Investigat-
ing Committee, the first act of which was to subpoena Simonton (his editor), 
Henry Raymond, and Horace Greeley (whose paper also broke aspects of the 
story). The committee demanded that the journalists reveal their sources and 
name the specific lobbyists and representatives who participated in the bribery. 
What happened next was unprecedented. Each journalist, in turn, refused to 
cooperate, citing the First Amendment and the so-called confidentiality of their 
sources. This term and the circumstance of its invocation have since been per-
manently associated with the proceedings of the Fourth Estate. In 1857, no such 
convention existed. It is somewhat unclear what inspired this act of defiance. 
Times historian Augustus Maverick claims that Simonton had filed his story 
based on unsubstantiated rumors and would not have had anything to reveal 
had he been willing (a suspicion Bennett also voiced).65 Whatever the case, 
Simonton was held in contempt, briefly incarcerated, and permanently barred 
from the Capitol building.
Bennett, at one time a champion of First Amendment rights, did not rush 
to the defense of his colleagues. The upstart Times, founded in 1851, was on its 
way to becoming, along with Greeley’s Tribune, the Herald’s nearest competi-
tor.66 Bennett seized on the House Lobby debacle as an opportunity to embarrass 
and discredit a potential usurper. Not surprisingly, he fixated on the repeated use 
of the word confidence. When Simonton or Raymond said “in confidence” or 
“confidential,” Bennett heard “secret,” and secrecy belied conspiracy. Bennett 
made the bold assumption that Simonton’s unwillingness to reveal his sources 
meant either that he had made the whole thing up (several congressmen testified 
to the contrary) or that he himself was embroiled in the racket. Simonton was 
referred to as “the little confidence man of the Washington lobby,” and Bennett 
made a convenient analogy between him and the “morally insane” Huntington:
As the defense of Huntington was thrown back upon the plea 
of “moral insanity,” so do these zealous guardians of the pub-
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lic treasury fall back upon the excuse of “moral conviction.” 
. . . In spite of the “moral convictions” and the excuses of 
“confidence” of this or that confidence man, we hope yet that 
the labors of the committee will result in breaking the ma-
chinery of the lobby confidence men.67
A few days later, he suggested that the Times had fabricated the whole ordeal, 
evidence of the paper’s habit of “gulling the public, in the ‘confidence’ game in 
favor of this or against that particular stock.”68 Bennett would continue to refer 
to Simonton and Raymond as “confidence men” for years to come. Mislead-
ingly, he conflated those who exposed the corruption with those who were party 
to it, suggesting, as was increasingly his habit in the 1850s, that nobody was 
innocent and that no party could be trusted.
Confidence Cassidy
From 1857 to 1861, Bennett used the term confidence man more loosely 
than ever before. The front pages of the Herald coveted crimes of confidence, 
which they began to define more broadly, affixing the moniker not only to 
counterfeiters, street hustlers, and quacks but also to safecrackers, pickpockets, 
pimps, and racketeers. Similarly, in the editorial pages, Bennett was increas-
ing its figurative utility. He would fasten his distinctive derogatory epithet to 
politicians and public figures as disparate as Greeley, Thurlow Weed, Erastus 
Corning, John Brown, Wendell Phillips, Samuel Tilden, William Seward, and 
John Hopkins Harney.69
In the buildup to the critical election of 1860, there was one final, essential 
development in Bennett’s evolving assault on confidence, emanating from a bil-
ious editorial battle with the Albany Atlas & Argus. The Atlas, edited by William 
Cassidy, absorbed Weed’s Argus in 1856, leaving the famed New York power 
broker free to devote his energy to the “Albany Regency,” Weed’s nickname for 
the loose affiliation of wealthy Whigs turned Know-Nothing Democrats turned 
Lincoln Republicans who had dominated the state’s political machine since the 
1820s. Bennett was in the habit of calling the Regency “the Albany confidence 
men.”70
Bennett and Weed had feuded throughout their careers, rivals in busi-
ness and politics.71 But in 1859, the Atlas & Argus’s coverage of a scandal that 
rocked the Democratic Party pushed Bennett to new polemical extremes. On 
August 4, Cassidy published a letter from Virginia Governor Henry Wise, one 
of the leading candidates for the Democratic presidential nomination. The letter 
offended a number of Democratic factions and revealed rifts within the party. 
The letter made Wise look Machiavellian, as he declared himself “confident 
of success” only if he undermined the candidacies of several of his supposed 
allies.72 It is not clear how the private correspondence got to Cassidy, but Je-
rome Mushkat reports that Bennett himself purchased a copy for $20 to pass 
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along to Democratic Committee Chairman Dean Richmond.73 Bennett had not 
intended to publish the letter, so he was outraged when it was leaked to a rival 
who used it to ruin Wise. Although there were clearly several copies in circula-
tion, the Herald editor chose to level all blame on Cassidy, accusing him of an 
“outrageous breach of confidence.”74 Now it was Bennett who wanted his fel-
low journalists to foster a more chivalrous sense of “confidentiality.” Cassidy 
fired back at Bennett, calling him “the chief of the Herald’s secret police,” and 
pointed out that he was guilty of the same breach, as he published the letter in 
full later the same day, having clearly held onto a copy for that express pur-
pose.75 Although it is unclear what, if anything, was at stake for either Cassidy 
or Bennett, the editorial pages of both papers were dominated for weeks by 
bickering over who had committed the first “violation of confidence connected 
with the affair.”76 Bennett labeled Cassidy “the Albany confidence man,” which 
he then shortened to “Confidence Cassidy,” an epithet that he continued to ap-
ply to the editor for the next several years. In no uncertain terms, he called for 
a hanging of Cassidy for “treachery” and described him trembling before the 
gallows, having his windpipe crushed, and wailing in agony.77 This nickname, 
Confidence Cassidy, represents the most egregious instance of Bennett turning 
the word confidence and all its potentially positive connotations into a powerful 
expression of derision. No longer was it necessary for Bennett to remind his 
readers of the “confidence man” association. Confidence alone was enough to 
elicit suspicion and spite.
Bennett characterized himself as a political moderate. The first issue of 
the Herald had claimed, “We shall support no party, be organ of no faction 
or coterie, and care nothing for the election of any candidate from President 
down to Constable. . . . We commit ourselves and our cause to the public, with 
perfect confidence.”78 It was thanks in large part to Bennett that the pretense 
to “objectivity” became a distinguishing characteristic of the penny press and 
American journalism thereafter.79 While it was true that he endorsed a wide 
variety of candidates in state, local, and national elections; never adhered to a 
strict party line; and never considered himself a partisan, Bennett did not ex-
actly abstain from politics either. The ferocity of his endorsements, combined 
with their inconsistency, was a source of ridicule for rivals. Some pointed out 
that, conveniently, from 1832 until 1860, Bennett never backed a presidential 
loser. Others characterized him as unreliable and capricious and even parodied 
the fact that he was cross-eyed. Bennett himself, in response to the charge of 
inconsistency, said simply, “I print my paper every day,” a statement that Carl 
Sandburg calls “his version of Lincoln’s ‘My policy is to have no policy.’”80 
What Bennett meant by moderation was not necessarily that he supported altru-
ism and compromise but rather that his paper was an ambivalent executioner. 
He printed blistering attacks against all parties. Whoever was left standing was 
therefore best qualified.
As the prospect of secession grew, Bennett sided more and more often with 
southern Democrats, for which he has been called “the most notorious of the 
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doughface editors.”81 While it is accurate to describe Bennett as a bigot, that 
hardly distinguishes him from his contemporaries. Accounts focusing on his 
southern sympathizing overlook the fact that he was also an avowed pacifist. 
Although he was infamous for his reversals on a number of issues, his foremost 
priority in the 1850s was utterly consistent: the avoidance of disunion and Civil 
War. He never overtly defended the sanctity of slavery but felt strongly that it 
was not as mortal a sin as war. Those who resorted to violence on either side, 
the “escalators,” be it John Brown, Preston Brooks, or the thugs of “bleed-
ing Kansas,” got the full wrath of Bennett’s legendarily spiteful pen. He railed 
against what he saw as extremist factions in both parties—Abolitionist Repub-
licans and the Democratic “fire-eaters,” whom he profanely labeled “the nigger 
drivers” and “the nigger worshippers”—but he felt, even in the aftermath of the 
war, that it was Abolitionists who were more stubbornly bent on dissolution, 
more politically powerful, and therefore most responsible for the bloody blem-
ish on the nation.
In recent decades, the ongoing debate among historians regarding the 
causes of the Civil War has been reframed. No longer is the question wheth-
er slavery was the primary cause; rather, it is why the sectional controversy 
reached critical mass in 1861.82 Slavery was the most divisive issue in Ameri-
can politics as early as 1787. It had inspired at least half a dozen episodes of 
extreme antagonism and violence in the intervening decades, and the prospect 
of secession had been part of the political landscape since at least 1832, when 
South Carolina made its first threat to that effect. On every previous occasion 
when hostilities reached a boiling point, political compromise preempted mili-
tary engagement, just as Bennett, the pacifist, would have hoped.
But the increasing influence of the paranoid style on antebellum culture 
made amelioration increasingly difficult, as rumors spread that various politi-
cians were forming more devious alliances, even representing rival nations. 
Michael Holt calls it, coincidently, “a crisis of confidence in the normal political 
process” characterized by “malignant distrust of politicians as self-centered and 
corrupt wirepullers out of touch with the people” and the belief “that powerful 
conspiracies, contemptuous of the law and abetted by corrupt politicians, had 
usurped government from the people and were menacing the most cherished 
values of Americans.”83 Sectional factions were reluctant to consider conces-
sionary measures because they believed their opponents to be duplicitous or in-
competent and were increasingly convinced that only violent revolution could 
fix the broken system.
The sad irony of Bennett’s career is that his systematic attacks on confi-
dence—the word and the temperament it described—were incompatible with 
the peaceful diplomacy he advocated. As the most popular pedagogue of the 
penny press, Bennett appealed to a large, literate, and politically disenfran-
chised proletariat. He aimed to persuade them, as much as anything, that no-
body, least of all those in power, were worthy of their trust: not politicians, not 
brokers and bankers, not even newspaper publishers. No single publication had 
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a greater hand in facilitating the “destruction of confidence” than the Herald. 
Bennett’s wildly popular newspaper was both a reflection of the public’s per-
vasive mistrust and also the most effective vehicle for its transmission. Bennett 
became one of the first and most effective purveyors of the paranoid style, a 
rhetorical mode that flourishes in eras of impending catastrophe. Bennett’s edi-
torials are entertaining in large part because of his willingness to, as Hofstadter 
puts it, “regard a ‘vast’ or ‘gigantic’ conspiracy as the motive force in histori-
cal events.”84 Bennett imagined all his various antagonists, from rival editors 
like Cassidy and Raymond to members of the political opposition like Weed to 
affronters in his personal life like Dan Sickles, as in league with one another, 
conspiring to destroy him and all he stood for, including his nation. Bennett 
portrayed all varieties of coalition, whether in the form of the Albany Regency 
or an imagined Wall Street cabal, as capable of occasioning catastrophe and 
therefore deserving of his readers’ full capacity for distrust and retribution.
By the end of the decade, Bennett was frequently arguing, in a fashion that 
can be read only as hyperbolic, for the incarceration and even execution of men 
like Cassidy who were peaceful and law-abiding citizens regardless of their 
politics. Hofstadter explains, “A fundamental paradox of the paranoid is the im-
itation of the enemy.”85 As Bennett became possessed by his fear of violent out-
breaks and eventual war, his rhetoric became, counterintuitively, more violent 
and inflammatory, thus provoking the same stubborn and futile impulses he was 
bent on discrediting. The fact that he suspected deviousness and demagoguery 
at every turn made it difficult for him to endorse any party. As Sandburg puts it, 
he was the “laughing Ishmael” of the 1860 election, whom Abraham Lincoln 
viewed as “one of the powers to be kept on the Union side as far as possible” 
but also recognized that “in politics [Bennett] had yoked himself to varied flick-
ering interests,” which made him an unreliable ally.86 Indeed, the spite that Ben-
nett levied on the Abolitionist elements in the Republican Party may have done 
as much harm as his praise of Lincoln did good.
Hofstadter’s profile of the paranoid style provides one explanation for why 
Bennett was such a successful and innovative figure in American journalism. 
He writes, “One of the impressive things about paranoid literature is precisely 
the elaborate concern with demonstration it almost invariably shows. . . . The 
paranoid mentality is far more coherent than the real world, since it leaves no 
room for mistakes, failures, or ambiguities.”87 Bennett cultivated a massive 
readership that applauded the Herald’s clarity and seeming comprehensiveness.
Elmer Davis wrote, “Bennett was the inventor of almost everything, good 
and bad, in modern journalism.”88 At his best, he was a vigilant investigative 
journalist who gave wielders of power a reason to pause before resorting to 
cheating, bribery, blackmail, or exploitation. At his worst, he believed in ear-
nest, something that the Original Confidence Man had only affected, that hu-
man nature was uncompromising, self-serving, and utterly without sympathy—
solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. He convinced his massive readership to 
see crooks lurking within every public figure, costly frauds beneath every prof-
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itable enterprise, and greasy handshakes behind every political compromise. 
He proved confidence to be what it now most certainly is: a propagandistic 
buzzword, favored by political campaigns and corporate promoters, that en-
dorses blind faith and irrational exuberance. James Gordon Bennett was among 
the first to recognize and lament this development in American rhetoric. His 
publication helped make it possible.
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